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Introduction 
 
The decision making process in labor markets is an economic topic of considerable 
import. Employers face a number of options in deciding whom to hire and at what wage they are 
willing to hire those employees. While these decisions may seem straight-forward from a 
distance, the specific decision to hire one person over another is often a very subjective affair 
that may well come down to the preferences, tastes, and perhaps biases of the individual making 
the decision. Economic theory would indicate that for a given job, the person hired is the one 
with the greatest net Marginal Revenue Product, but in a labor market full of risk, uncertainty, 
and misinformation it is not always possible to identify the right candidate. Any insight that can 
be gained into the factors that shape hiring decisions is valuable information for the study of 
labor economics. Unfortunately, this is a difficult area to study due to the lack of standardized 
information about whom employers consider for job positions, which candidates they hire for 
these jobs, and how their subsequent performance compares to expectations. In most industries it 
is impossible to control or account for all the variables and factors that can skew the analysis of 
employee hiring. Fortunately the world of professional sports features a richness of data that 
allows researchers to overcome many of these challenges. 
The advantages of analyzing hiring decisions in professional sports derive from the 
highly controlled hiring markets as well as the fact that individual performance can be more 
easily measured than in most industries (since athletes do their job in front of thousands of 
people and their performance is widely reported through the media). Sports statistics are also 
carefully monitored and are readily accessible for researchers to analyze. In short, the sports 
market provides a well controlled environment that is highly conducive to the study of labor 
economics in general, and hiring decisions in particular. While many of the factors that shape 
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hiring decisions are specific to individual sports, some of the decision making trends echo 
similar trends in other hiring markets. A review of the literature in this area reveals a variety of 
hiring themes that are analyzed (For more on labor economics in the sports industry, see Kahn, 
2000) 
In this paper I analyze the NBA hiring market, specifically the NBA Draft. My objective 
was to create a model that detects bias in the way different groups of players are drafted. To this 
end I will present control models that predict the eventual value of players based on where they 
are selected in the Draft. If a group of players consistently over-performs relative to their 
expected value, as predicted by the model, then I conclude that the group in question is 
experiencing negative bias in the Draft. The opposite also holds if a group consistently under-
performs relative to their predicted value. In this scenario I conclude that there is a bias in that 
group’s favor. Using this method I detected bias related to high school players, centers, black 
players, and foreign players. The nature of each of these biases is unique. The bias works in 
favor of some groups while it works against others. Some groups experience bias throughout the 
Draft while others are specific to one round, or to certain years in the data1: 
• High school players are discriminated against in the Draft, especially when they 
are selected with a lottery pick 
• Centers experience the opposite effect in the lottery and are consistently drafted 
too high in that part of the Draft 
• Black players are consistently drafted too low in the first round, and then too high 
in the second round 
                                                 
1
 Appendix A shows where the players from these groups were drafted from 1995-2003. 
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• Foreign players were drafted too low from 1995-2001, and then too high in 2002 
and 2003 
Each of these effects point to unique trends in the NBA labor market. 
The rest of this paper will proceed as follows. In the next section I briefly review the 
literature on discrimination in sports, focusing on the interplay of risk aversion and option value, 
Draft order bias, and racial bias. Next I explain my method for quantitatively valuing players and 
comparing player performance across years. From there I present my control models which give 
an expected value for every player in the Draft as a function of which pick they are selected with. 
After an explanation of some of the issues I encountered and how I controlled for different data 
problems, I present my results for each of the four groups. These results lead into the conclusion. 
 
Literature Review 
 There is a great deal of literature that focuses on the economics of discrimination. 
One of the most important, and earliest, works in this area is Gary Becker’s 1957 dissertation, 
“The Economics of Discrimination”. The literature on discrimination in sports is nicely 
summarized in Lawrence Kahn’s 1991 survey, “Discrimination in Professional Sports: A Survey 
of the Literature” as well as his 2000 paper mentioned earlier. His work has focused primarily on 
discrimination in pay, hiring, and promotion as well as the institution of “stacking”. Though 
some authors have looked at discrimination in the player Draft, that dimension of discrimination 
has received far less attention than the other forms. A review of the literature in this area reveals 
a variety of hiring themes that are analyzed.  
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1. Risk Aversion, Option Value, and Draft Order Bias 
A major issue in any market involving uncertainty is the interplay of risk aversion and 
option value. How one chooses to manage risk will have an effect on any hiring decision. This 
effect is particularly pronounced in the sports hiring market where the level of uncertainty is 
fairly high.  
The effect of risk aversion and option value on hiring practices has been explored in 
detail in the context of the NFL Draft by Hendricks, DeBrock & Koenker (2001). In that paper 
the authors compare two groups of potential NFL players. Those players who played for 
Division 1 schools are considered the low risk group while all other players are placed in the 
higher risk group. The study found that teams were risk averse and demonstrated a preference for 
drafting low risk players (who had a high likelihood of being successful professionals) in the 
early rounds. The result was that on average when controlling for Draft position, non-Division 1 
players had careers that were more successful (since the drafting teams paid a premium for low 
risk Division I players). This risk aversion caused non-Division I players to be drafted later, 
which led to them outperforming their Draft position as a group. In the later rounds, this trend 
shifted since fewer drafted players were likely to become successful pros. In these rounds more 
value was placed on a player’s option value. Division 1 players drafted in these rounds had better 
careers, on average, than their non-Division 1 counterparts since teams would rather “gamble” 
on a high variance player at that point in the Draft. 
 A study by Groothius, Hill & Perri in 2005 found that option value plays a role in the 
NBA Draft as well. With the new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in 1995, the NBA 
instituted the rookie pay scale for first round picks that locked players into set three-year 
contracts. These contracts often paid less than a player’s MRP and created a window for players 
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to be evaluated before signing a large contract. Given relatively inexpensive labor and this 
extended period over which to evaluate players, the authors found that teams had an added 
incentive to pursue riskier players. My analysis will further explore the role of risk and option 
value in the NBA Draft. 
 
2. Racial Bias in Sports Hiring 
 Another hiring trend that can be analyzed through the lens of sports is racial bias in hiring 
markets. Racism has played a significant role in American history and continues to be a major 
issue of concern. Economists have looked at this issue in the context of the NBA and some have 
found significant results. In his paper, “Racial Differences in Professional Basketball Players’ 
Compensation”, Lawrence Kahn analyzed NBA salaries for the 1985-86 season and reached an 
interesting conclusion. He found that though black and white players received equal 
compensation on average, this was no longer true once he controlled for performance. On 
average black players performed at a higher level than whites, and when his salary model 
controlled for this fact he found that black players were underpaid by about 20% compared to 
their white counterparts. He theorized that this bias was able to go largely unnoticed since the 
average compensation was the same for both groups. Had black and white players in the NBA 
had the same average ability then it would have been much more glaring that white players were 
making an average of 20% more (Kahn & Sherer, 1988). This evidence points to some kind of 
discrimination, but it is important to identify the specific form of discrimination at work. 
As Kahn points out, if the discrimination stems from preferences of owners, coaches, or 
other players then the effect would be to drive black players towards certain teams that did not 
discriminate. We can realistically assume that these teams exist, given that the majority of 
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players in the league are black and there are also many black coaches. The discriminating teams 
would be willing to pay a premium for white talent while the non-discriminating teams would 
get higher quality labor at a cheaper price. The result of this is a system that forces the 
discriminating teams to either change their ways or continually underachieve relative to their 
more inclusive counterparts. This scenario does not appear to fairly describe the NBA. Kahn 
proposes instead that the driving factor is consumer discrimination. In defining consumer 
discrimination, Gary Becker stresses the difference between two individuals being “perfect 
substitutes in production” versus being “perfect substitutes in marketable production” (Becker, 
1971). While a black player and a white player may have identical skills, if a largely white fan 
base prefers watching the white player then his MRP will be higher based on his greater 
marketable production. Unlike the situation where teams are the discriminating agents, this 
scenario is not self-correcting. As long as this sort of fan bias exists, it will be profitable to pay a 
premium to have white players on your team. According to Kahn, this was the source of the 20% 
pay disparity.  
One peculiarity in Kahn’s results is that when he analyzed the NBA Draft he found that 
black players were selected higher on average than their white counterparts, and when he 
controlled for ability he found no racial Draft order bias. While this supports the idea that the 
bias comes from the fans and not the team, it points to an inconsistency in the way teams were 
being run at that time. In drafting players, teams seemed to value talent above all else, and in 
doing so they drafted in a way that may be considered more ethical by some. However if we 
believe customer discrimination is significant in the NBA, then we can also say that the teams’ 
drafting behavior was not profit maximizing. On the other hand, when signing free agents, teams 
sought to maximize profits by overpaying marketable white players. This approach does not 
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appear to be a rational equilibrium strategy, and I suspect that analysis of more recent data would 
reflect different behavior. Assuming that teams seek to maximize profits, over time it stands to 
reason that there has either been a decline in consumer discrimination or teams have begun to 
favor white players in the Draft over equally talented black players. If there really is a premium 
on white players then it should be reflected in the Draft as well as in free agency. 
More recent evidence indicates that there may still be consumer bias among NBA fans, 
but not nearly as much as was found for 1986. A study based on the 2001-2002 season found 
shortfalls in salary, total compensation, and contract duration for marginal black players versus 
their white counterparts. The results did not, however, show a significant effect among free 
agents or players under their rookie contracts (Kahn & Shah, 2005).  
Looking beyond salaries, there is more evidence for consumer bias. A study looking at 
Nielsen ratings for televised NBA games found that, other things equal, more fans tune in to 
games when there are a greater number of white players on the competing teams (Kanazawa & 
Funk, 2001). Accordingly, it should be more profitable to field a white team over a black team of 
equal talent. This creates a market environment that encourages pay discrimination.  
If the market for NBA talent is partially driven by bias, one would expect this 
discrimination to be reflected in the hiring process. Though the evidence for racial bias in the 
NBA today is not all that strong, it is certainly possible that race plays a role in shaping hiring 
decisions. 
 
The NBA Draft 
The NBA Draft has been a part of the NBA since the league’s formation in 1949. An 
annual event held in June, its purpose is to distribute the best available amateur talent to each of 
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the teams in the league. As the league has evolved over time, the rules of the Draft have changed 
fairly significantly, but it has existed in more or less the same form since 1995. The Draft 
provides a unique opportunity to analyze the hiring decisions of each team, and how a player’s 
performance compares to his anticipated value on Draft day. The pool of available talent consists 
of college seniors who have finished their college basketball careers, underclassmen and high 
school seniors2 who forego their college eligibility and declare themselves eligible for the Draft, 
and international players who choose to make themselves Draft eligible. Today, the Draft 
consists of two rounds with each team receiving one pick per round. With just one exception, the 
order of the Draft is determined by each team’s record during the previous season. The teams 
with the lowest win totals select first in an attempt to maintain competitive balance within the 
league. The order of both rounds is set by this reverse order of finish with the exception of the 
first three picks of the first round. These picks are distributed by a lottery that includes all of the 
teams that fail to make the playoffs in the previous season.3 This lottery is heavily weighted so 
the weakest teams of the group have a better chance of receiving these high picks. However, 
since all the teams that miss the playoffs have some chance of getting these lottery picks they are 
often referred to as “lottery” teams, a term that I will be using frequently in this paper. Once the 
top three picks are set, the rest of the round continues based on the previous year’s win-loss 
record. 
When a player is drafted, that team has exclusive rights to sign the player to a contract. 
Players selected in the first round receive a guaranteed three year contract4 that pays them a pre-
                                                 
2
 Due to a recent rule change, high school seniors are no longer eligible to be drafted; however this rule was not in 
place during the time of my study. High school players play an important role in my analysis. 
3
 There are currently 14 such teams in the lottery since 16 of the 30 NBA teams make the playoffs. However, for the 
time of my study there were only 29 NBA teams so the lottery consisted of 13 teams. 
4
 Starting with the 1998 Draft, teams also had an option to keep players on their rookie contract for a fourth year. 
This rule change will resurface as something I control for when running my regressions. 
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determined salary based on their Draft position.5 The higher a player is drafted, the more money 
he makes; but there is no negotiation involved due to this pre-set rookie salary scale. In most 
cases, these rookie contracts pay less than a player’s true market value. Once these contracts 
expire, players become “free agents” and are free to sign with the highest bidder. Only then will 
they get paid in a manner that reflects their true worth. Second round picks do not enjoy the same 
job security as players taken in the first round. These players receive no guaranteed contracts and 
have to earn their roster spots before signing a deal. Many of these players never make it in the 
NBA, and those that do typically sign one or two year contracts for the league minimum. If they 
are successful, they are re-signed at a price that accurately reflects their market value. 
 
Data 
 In order to run an NBA Draft-order bias model, I had to collect a significant amount of 
data. Fortunately sports data is widely available. My analysis focuses on NBA players drafted 
from 1995-2003. The required salary data is available on Patricia Bender’s highly regarded 
basketball website as well as the USA Today online salary database. Ms. Bender’s site also gives 
a history of NBA Draft picks and basic information about the players selected. This data includes 
where the player was selected, where they played basketball previously (high school, college, 
international, etc.), and their position on the court. 
 
Measuring Player Value 
 The first step in creating a model of Draft-order bias is to identify some quantitative 
measure of player value that allows us to compare the relative value of different players. Luckily, 
the structure of the Draft creates an environment that is conducive to just such a comparison. 
                                                 
5
 Appendix B features a sample rookie contract scale from the 2003 Draft. 
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Since the rookie contracts of players drafted in the first round are standardized, they do not 
provide a useful way to compare players. The only thing these contracts reflect is the player’s 
Draft position. These contracts do, however, create an evaluation period in which each player 
can be observed before they become free agents and receive a market-value contract. Over this 
time, all of the teams in the league have an opportunity to gauge each player’s worth. Therefore, 
when players eventually re-sign, we can well assume that their salary is reflective of their true 
market value. The other benefit of the rookie contract is that all of the first round picks begin 
their second contracts at the same time. Players selected in the second round never have scaled 
contracts and are already receiving their market value by the time the first round picks re-sign, 
assuming they are still in the league. For my analysis, I use the salary that each player received in 
the year after their Draft class completed their rookie contracts as the quantitative measure of 
that player’s value. 
 There are other approaches that I considered as a measure of value, but each had its own 
pitfalls. One completely different approach would be to use performance statistics from games as 
a way of rating players, and to compare value in this way. This would be a complicated process 
and the values it produced could be distorted by what kind of role a player is asked to play. 
Further, any intangible things that a player does on the floor are not picked up by statistics. 
Ultimately, it is always reasonable to assume that employees in competitive labor markets are 
paid what they are worth and any approach that wasn’t based on salary would be unnecessarily 
indirect.  
I also considered using career earnings to measure worth. The flaw here was that a player 
whose career was cut short by injury would have career earnings that were not reflective of his 
talent level. Since the purpose of this analysis is to compare pre-Draft expectations to post-Draft 
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performance, one cannot expect teams to foresee injuries late in a player’s career when they are 
drafting that player.  
Another possible approach is to employ a player’s average career salary, but this would 
misjudge players who play past their prime for less money. Further, it would reward players who 
improve later in their careers (improvement that would not be foreseeable to teams on the night 
of the Draft). These approaches were all reasonable, but ultimately the post-rookie salary 
provides the best form of comparison between players from a given Draft year. 
 
Standardizing Player Salaries 
 To proceed with the model, it is not sufficient to simply compare players to others from 
their own Draft class; we must also be able to compare players across years. As mentioned 
above, the data I use for this study consists of players drafted from 1995-2003. I do not go back 
further than 1995, because that is the first year in which there was a set scale for rookie contracts. 
Prior to 1995, players negotiated their contracts freely with the teams that drafted them. This 
eliminates the evaluation period that exists in the current format; hence any comparison to years 
before 1995 would bring a whole series of other variables into play. The last Draft class in my 
study is 2003, because that is the most recent Draft class that has signed new contracts.  
In order to compare all of these players in one model, I standardize their salaries by 
adjusting for inflation. To do this, I took an average of the salaries of the top 300 players in the 
league for every year, starting in 19986. 
                                                 
6
 This is the year in which the Draft class of 1995 signed their post-rookie contracts. 
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  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Avg. 
Salary 
($) 3,329,798  
   
4,061,828  
   
4,652,584  
  
4,878,173  
  
5,237,556  
 
5,226,058  
      
5,452,104  
      
5,815,815  
      
5,954,811  
      
6,404,399  
% of 
1998 100% 122% 140% 147% 157% 157% 164% 175% 179% 192% 
 
Using the percent change in average salary from year to year, I deflated the contracts signed in 
every year after 1998 using the index value corresponding to that year. With standardized 
salaries for the period in question, it is now possible to construct a model that predicts 
performance based on Draft position for the Draft classes from 1995-2003. 
 
Draft Position Effects 
 The control model for this analysis should predict the eventual salary of a player selected 
anywhere in the Draft based on when they were drafted. There will certainly be players who 
deviate from this expected performance, given the amount of uncertainty that is inherent in the 
Draft, but for any group of players we would expect to see that deviation distributed evenly. That 
is to say, for a given group of players, there should be as many individuals who over-perform 
relative to where they are selected as there are players that under-perform. Any group that 
consistently falls on one side of this would appear to be experiencing some sort of bias.  
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There are a number of ways to control for Draft position effects. Ultimately, I considered 
three Draft position control models. Each Draft position control model takes a unique shape, but 
ultimately they all generate similar results. 
 
1. Polynomial Control 
 The first control model I employed was a simple third-order polynomial that fits a smooth 
curve to the data. The variables I used were the position in which a player was picked (Pick), that 
number squared (Pick^2), and that same number cubed (Pick^3). I also included dummy 
variables for the Draft classes from 1997, 2000, and 2002, as those Drafts were particularly weak 
and the model needs to control for this.7 Using this polynomial model, I attained the following 
results8: 
Polynomial Control 
Model 
-$412,418 
Pick 
(8.96) 
$9,941 
Pick^2 
(5.58) 
$82 
Pick^3 
(4.16) 
-$515,607 
1997 
(2.20) 
-$574,336 
2000 
(2.46) 
-$400,355 
2002 
(1.67) 
$6,797,664 
Constant 
(20.82) 
Chi^2 334.53 
 
                                                 
7
 The coefficient for each of these dummy variables is negative and statistically significant. These dummies are 
intuitive since a weak talent pool will have a negative effect on every pick, bringing each value down. 
8
 All interval regression results have 514 observations, 255 uncensored observations, 29 right-censored observations, 
and 230 interval observations. Z-values are shown in parentheses. 
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When placed on a graph, with Draft position on the X-axis and adjusted salary on the Y-axis, the 
Polynomial control model looks like this:9 
 
This smooth path cuts through what is a jagged set of results. One issue with this model is that it 
briefly curves upward in the early second round. This movement violates an obvious and basic 
assumption that it is always better to pick earlier in the Draft. Overall, the movement is minor 
and does not take away too much from the model. The next control model takes a different 
approach. 
 
2. Stepwise Control Model 
 My second control model is stepwise linear with steep drops that reflect those in the 
actual data. This model assumes that there are a series of steps, where the talent is fairly similar, 
and then steeper drops down to the next level. The levels selected capture the significant drop-
offs in the average salary of players selected at each position. This model employs a set of 
dummy variables with dummies for a top 5 pick, picks 6-7, picks 8-10, and picks 11-21. In 
                                                 
9
 The graph is applicable for any year besides 1997, 2000, and 2002. For these years you would subtract the 
appropriate coefficient and shift the graph down accordingly. 
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addition to these dummies I included a ‘pick’ variable, which corresponds to where a player was 
selected, in order to pick up linear trends in the relationship between Draft pick and value. As in 
the Polynomial model, I added dummy variables for each of the three weak Draft years. This 
model produced the following results: 
Stepwise Control 
Model 
$3,934,576 Top 5 
Pick (9.67) 
$2,785,367 
Picks 6-7 
(5.60) 
$1,910,789 Picks 8-
10 (4.62) 
$752,407 Picks 11-
21 (2.78) 
-$27,991 
Pick 
(3.41) 
-$519,041 
1997 
(2.25) 
-$575,495 
2000 
(2.51) 
-$405,821 
2002 
(1.72) 
$2,068,453 
Constant 
(6.00) 
Chi^2 351.29 
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This graph presents a somewhat different profile than the Polynomial model, though the values 
are similar. The Stepwise model has the added advantage of being a strictly decreasing model. 
The final control model reveals the chaos that the prior two models attempt to fit. 
 
3. Dummy Control Model 
 In order to create the most rigorous control possible, this final model simply uses a 
dummy variable for each position in the Draft (excepting one, so as to avoid co-linearity). The 
graph of the Dummy control model therefore just reflects the average salary achieved by the 
players who were drafted in each Draft position. The graph of these results is much less orderly: 
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The graph reflects the great deal of error and uncertainty that are a staple of the drafting process. 
While this control model provides the strongest test for the independent variables that will be 
included in the model, with a chi^2 value of 376.54, it is also the most flawed control model. A 
fundamental assumption of this analysis is that it is always better to have an earlier pick in the 
Draft. This much is obvious, since the pool of players is larger the earlier you pick. However, 
this dummy control model violates this assumption in places where the projected value of one 
pick is lower than the projected value of the next. One example of this is the difference between 
the 11th pick, which spikes down and the 12th pick, which has a higher value. Nobody would 
argue that the 12th pick is preferable to the 11th, yet that is what this model implicitly assumes. 
This anomaly, which can be observed with other picks as well, is clearly a result of random 
chance and the limited sample size of just nine years. In contrast, the Stepwise model fits the 
data in a strictly decreasing fashion and the Polynomial model adheres to this rule except for the 
brief stretch where it increases slightly in the second round. 
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It is evident from this overlay that these three models track each other fairly closely. As I will 
show in the next section, the regression results are similar regardless of which Draft position 
control model is used. 
 
The Base Combination Model 
 The results I will be reporting below are based on a base combination model that includes 
the control variables just discussed, as well as six additional dummy variables that I found to 
pick up on statistically significant trends in the way that players are drafted. They are: 
• High school lottery picks 
• Centers picked in the lottery 
• Black players 
• Black players taken in the second round 
19 
 
• Foreign players 
• Foreign players drafted from 1995-2001 
The base combination model includes all of these variables simultaneously since some of the 
players fall into multiple categories and just including one variable at a time will not successfully 
isolate the effects. 
 Using this base combination model I compared the results from the three control models 
and found that the coefficients and z-values were generally very similar.  
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Note that the over-fitted Dummy model produces results very similar to those of the other two. 
The only notable disparity to be found is in the center-lottery effect. This is likely a result of how 
the Stepwise model flattens out the projections for top five picks. In this regard the other Draft 
position control models may be more on target, but either way the z-value for centers in the 
lottery is statistically significant. The majority of my analysis will focus on the results from the 
Stepwise control model 
 
Data Issue I: Length of Rookie Contracts 
 Earlier, I mentioned a slight adjustment to the rookie contract rules between the 1997 and 
1998 Drafts. Rookie contracts had been guaranteed for three years, but starting in 1998 they were 
guaranteed for three years with a team option to retain the player for a fourth year. In most cases, 
this option was utilized, since the rookie pay scale tends to pay players less than their market 
value. This creates an inconsistency in the analysis where, from 1995-1997, I evaluate players 
based on their salary in their fourth year, while from 1998-2003, my evaluation comes from the 
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players’ fifth year salary. In general, players make more money each year that they are in the 
league, so it was possible that this difference might skew the results.  
To test for this possibility, I first ran models for each of my controls with relevant 
variables included. I then re-ran the same models, using adjusted fifth year salary for the players 
from 1995-1997, instead of the adjusted fourth year salary, as I had been doing: 
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As you can see from these results, there is a negligible difference in both coefficients and z-
values when the model uses fifth year salaries for the 1995-1997 draftees. The rookie contract 
length proves to be a non-issue in skewing the results. 
 
Data Issue II: Salary Censoring 
 A much more pressing issue than rookie contract length was the problem of censored 
salary data. This censoring happens in two different ways, at opposite ends of the pay spectrum. 
  
1. Maximum Contracts 
The first issue is that the NBA sets maximum contracts for individual players. The table 
below presents these values by year and years of NBA experience:10 
Years 
in 
NBA 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 
0 $9,000,000  $9,000,000  $9,658,000  $10,625,000  $10,067,750  $10,960,000  $10,968,000  $12,000,000  $12,455,000  $13,041,250  
1 $9,000,000  $9,000,000  $9,658,000  $10,625,000  $10,067,750  $10,960,000  $10,968,000  $12,000,000  $12,455,000  $13,041,250  
2 $9,000,000  $9,000,000  $9,658,000  $10,625,000  $10,067,750  $10,960,000  $10,968,000  $12,000,000  $12,455,000  $13,041,250  
3 $9,000,000  $9,000,000  $9,658,000  $10,625,000  $10,067,750  $10,960,000  $10,968,000  $12,000,000  $12,455,000  $13,041,250  
4 $9,000,000  $9,000,000  $9,658,000  $10,625,000  $10,067,750  $10,960,000  $10,968,000  $12,000,000  $12,455,000  $13,041,250  
5 $9,000,000  $9,000,000  $9,658,000  $10,625,000  $10,067,750  $10,960,000  $10,968,000  $12,000,000  $12,455,000  $13,041,250  
6 $9,000,000  $9,000,000  $9,658,000  $10,625,000  $10,067,750  $10,960,000  $10,968,000  $12,000,000  $12,455,000  $13,041,250  
7 $11,000,000  $11,000,000  $11,589,000  $12,750,000  $12,081,300  $13,152,000  $13,161,000  $14,400,000  $14,946,000  $15,649,500  
8 $11,000,000  $11,000,000  $11,589,000  $12,750,000  $12,081,300  $13,152,000  $13,161,000  $14,400,000  $14,946,000  $15,649,500  
9 $11,000,000  $11,000,000  $11,589,000  $12,750,000  $12,081,300  $13,152,000  $13,161,000  $14,400,000  $14,946,000  $15,649,500  
10+ $14,000,000  $14,000,000  $14,000,000  $14,875,000  $14,094,850  $15,344,000  $15,355,000  $16,800,000  $17,437,000  $18,257,750  
 
Players earning the maximum are the NBA’s elite. As a result there were only 29 players who 
fell into this category, out of the 51411 total players in the dataset. The statistical issue that arises 
                                                 
10
 Table is from cbafaq.com 
11
 514 players represents every player drafted from 1995-2003 except for five that I omitted from the data for 
various reasons:  
-Dermarr Johnson (‘00, #6) was in a near fatal car crash that derailed his career while under his rookie contract. 
-Jay Williams (‘02, #2) was in a near fatal motorcycle accident after his rookie year that ended his career. 
-Dajuan Wagner (‘02, #6) suffered a debilitating colon condition after his rookie year that ended his career. 
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is that since there is a maximum, these player’s salaries do not reflect their true market value. 
When a player earns the maximum we only know that he is worth some amount that is greater 
than or equal to what he is paid. A simple ordinary least squares regression (OLS) will value that 
player at the statutory maximum, which likely undervalues his actual worth. This problem 
represents the upper half of the censoring issue. 
 
2. NBA Dropouts 
 The lower half of the censoring problem occurs with players who do not make it beyond 
the rookie contract window and who are therefore earning zero NBA dollars during the year in 
which I evaluate them. Since there is a league minimum salary, we know that these players are 
worth something between zero dollars and the league minimum, but we have no way of being 
any more specific. Furthermore, there is the issue of players at the league minimum, who might 
have a true worth lower than that value, but their salary is inflated by the artificial wage floor. 
The league minimums, by year and years of NBA experience, are in the table below:12 
Years 
in 
NBA 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 
0 $287,500 $301,875 $316,969 $332,817 $349,458 $366,931 $385,277 $398,762 $412,718 $427,163 
1 $350,000 $385,000 $423,500 $465,850 $512,435 $563,679 $620,046 $641,748 $664,209 $687,456 
2 $425,000 $460,000 $498,500 $540,850 $587,435 $638,679 $695,046 $719,373 $744,551 $770,610 
3 $450,000 $485,000 $523,500 $565,850 $612,435 $663,679 $720,046 $745,248 $771,331 $798,328 
4 $475,000 $510,000 $548,500 $590,850 $637,435 $688,679 $745,046 $771,123 $798,112 $826,046 
5 $537,500 $572,500 $611,000 $653,350 $699,935 $751,179 $807,546 $835,810 $865,063 $895,341 
6 $600,000 $635,000 $673,500 $715,850 $762,435 $813,679 $870,046 $900,498 $932,015 $964,636 
7 $662,500 $697,500 $736,000 $778,350 $824,935 $876,179 $932,546 $965,185 $998,967 $1,033,930 
8 $725,000 $760,000 $798,500 $840,850 $887,435 $938,679 $995,046 $1,029,873 $1,065,918 $1,103,225 
9 $850,000 $885,000 $923,500 $965,850 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,035,000 $1,071,225 $1,108,718 
10+ $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,030,000 $1,070,000 $1,100,000 $1,138,500 $1,178,348 $1,219,590 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
-Nenad Krstic (‘02, #24) did not join his team until a few years after being drafted and is still on his rookie contract. 
-Carlos Delfino (’03, #25) similar situation to Krstic, also still on his rookie contract. 
12
 Table is from cbafaq.com 
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This problem is compounded by the large number of players to whom it applies. Of the 514 
players in the data, 230 (about 45%) were no longer in the league by the end of the rookie 
contract window. In an OLS model, these players are all treated as having an NBA market value 
of zero dollars. 
 
Interval Regression Model 
 The answer to each of these censoring issues is to run an interval regression. The interval 
regression is effectively able to process both points and intervals as the dependent variable, using 
maximum likelihood estimation to fit the model to these values.13 In the interval regression 
approach, any player not subject to the above salary constraints is simply entered as a point 
value, as they would be in an OLS regression. Players earning the maximum have a lower bound 
that is their adjusted salary, and an indefinite upper bound. In this way, the model allows for their 
market worth to exceed their salary level. At the lower end of the salary spectrum, I first made 
the assumption that players earning the minimum were actually worth that amount. I felt safe in 
this assumption because of the large number of players who are drafted and do not make it in the 
NBA. With such a large pool of players fighting for limited spots at the bottom of the league’s 
pay chart, one would expect that the players who are signed are actually worth that amount, or at 
least very close to it. By making this assumption, I was able to treat players earning the 
minimum as point values in the maximum likelihood estimation and separate them from players 
who are not in the league. In the interval regression model, NBA dropouts are treated as having 
an NBA market value in the interval between zero and the league salary minimum for that 
player. These intervals differ from player to player. Since the NBA’s minimum salary is 
dependent on how many years a player has been in the league, players who were in the league a 
                                                 
13
 See Appendix C for a more detailed explanation. 
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few years, but did not play past their rookie contract window, are subject to a higher minimum 
salary than players who never signed with a team. Accordingly, the interval regression model 
distinguishes between these players by creating a higher ceiling on the interval for a player who 
played in the league for longer. This modeling flexibility significantly improves the way the 
model represents actual player value. As a representation of reality, the interval regression seems 
far superior to the OLS. However, when we compare results, we find very similar coefficients, as 
well as t and z-values, in the OLS and interval regression models. 
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Where there are small differences, the interval regression model tends to generate larger 
coefficients with greater statistical significance. I believe this is attributable to the underlying 
reality of the trends that this model picks up, and the fact that the interval regression model is 
simply more statistically appropriate than the OLS approach. 
 
Specification of the Draft-Order Bias Control Model 
 In order to proceed with the analysis, it is necessary to settle on one control model so that 
the results can be compared consistently. Of the three control models, the Polynomial and 
Stepwise were the most true to my assumptions about the Draft. Of those two, I chose to focus 
on the Stepwise model, which fits the data slightly better and is strictly decreasing. On the issue 
of three and four year rookie contracts, I decided to use the fourth year salary of players taken 
from 1995-1997, rather than the fifth year salary. As discussed above, the differences between 
the two approaches were very small and I decided it was more consistent to always take the year 
after the rookie contract window. Finally, the easiest decision was to run interval regressions 
rather than OLS. The interval regression approach is precisely designed to appropriately 
incorporate heterogeneous censored salary data in the statistical analysis.  So, to review:  The 
Draft-order bias control model features: 
• Inflation adjusted salaries for 514 NBA players drafted in the period 1995-2003 
• Maximum likelihood estimation using an interval regression model, with salaries of 
league maximum players and NBA dropouts mapped to intervals 
• Stepwise controls for Draft pick effects 
• Fourth year salaries reflecting players’ market values for players drafted from 1995-1997 
and fifth year salaries for players drafted from 1998-2003 
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• Dummies for three weak Draft years: 1997, 2000, and 2002 
Using this model I will break down the four biases I detected in the drafting of NBA players. 
 
High School Effect 
 Starting with the selection of Kevin Garnett in the 1995 Draft, high school players began 
to pop up on the radars of many NBA teams. Garnett was not the first player ever to be drafted 
out of high school, Shawn Kemp and Moses Malone are two prior examples, but he began a 
trend that led to at least one high school player being selected in every subsequent year, until the 
NBA recently raised its age requirement prior to the 2006 Draft. As Groothius, Hill, and Perri 
(2005) point out, this trend had a lot to do with the institution of the rookie pay scale, which 
encouraged teams to pursue riskier players. High school players are certainly riskier prospects 
since they are younger and have not played against top competition, as college players have. 
Despite this risk, they also represent an elite level of talent. Players who declare themselves 
eligible to be drafted out of high school are almost always players who are good enough to be 
assured of a fairly high selection; otherwise, they would choose to play in college before 
declaring for the NBA. As a group, high school players who declare for the Draft, create an 
opportunity to analyze how NBA teams deal with the risk-aversion/option-value dichotomy. 
 To test for any bias in the drafting of high school players, I inserted a dummy variable for 
players entering the Draft out of high school. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
$944,39
9    
$233,70
5 $453,840   
$224,47
7 
High 
School 
(2.60)    (0.29) (0.92)   (0.28) 
  
$1,120,64
8   
$888,17
3   
$585,79
1 
$363,80
6 HS Rd. 1 
  (2.77)   (0.99)   (0.95 (0.36) 
HS 
   $1,521,27   $1,069,04 $937,05 $934,76
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4 1 7 3 
Lottery 
    (2.84)   (1.47) (1.15) (1.15) 
 
The first column shows the result of this first regression with high school players returning a 
large and statistically significant coefficient. The coefficient of $944,399 indicates that, given 
their position in the Draft, a high school player will generally earn $944,399 more in their next 
contract than the average player selected at that Draft position. Given the size of this coefficient, 
I ran further models, in an attempt to isolate where this effect originates. In columns 2-7, there 
are results for the model when run with additional variables representing high school first round 
picks, lottery picks, and combinations of the different dummy variables. These models indicate 
that the bulk of both the high school coefficient value and the statistical significance lie with high 
school players drafted in the lottery. 
  Though the actual number of high school players is rather small, the effect is 
pronounced. Over the period of my data, 1995-2003, there were 22 high school players drafted; 
17 of these were taken in the first round, and 11 were lottery picks. Despite the limited sample 
size, the effect is statistically significant, and it remains significant when the other biases I will 
be analyzing are added to the model. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
$1,521,274 $1,681,296 $1,436,276 $1,507,133 $1,571,251 HS 
Lottery (2.84) (3.13) (2.69) (2.82) (2.95) 
  -$1,098,424     -$936,200 Center 
Lot   (3.06)     (2.59) 
    $438,553   $401,490 
Black 
    (2.14)   (1.84) 
   -$606,688  -$547,852 Black Rd 
2    (2.43)  (2.20) 
      -$465,656 -$390,714 
Foreign 
      (-1.54) (1.24) 
     $827,194 $814,509 
For 95-01 
      (2.10) (2.09) 
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There is some movement when different variables are added to the model, but the direction of 
this movement is intuitive and not surprising. When the ‘Center Lottery’ variable is added, the 
high school coefficient and z-value both increase. Since the coefficient signs are opposite, the 
two effects complement each other. This relationship is enhanced by the fact that some of the 
less successful high school lottery picks were centers. In the next column, when the black player 
effect is included, you see the opposite movement from the high school lottery variable. In this 
case, the signs of the two effects are the same; furthermore, all of the high school players in my 
data were black. This means that the two variables pick up on some of the same things when they 
are run separately; when run together, their coefficients are somewhat diminished. Regardless, in 
the final model, which includes all of the effects that I analyzed, the high school lottery 
coefficient is $1,571,251 and significant at the 99% level with a z-value of 2.95. Clearly, this is a 
large coefficient, but it can be difficult to decipher exactly what it means. By applying the 
coefficient to the original control model, we can get a better sense of the strength of this effect.  
 When we add the high school coefficient to the expected value of a Draft pick based on 
the control model we can see how the coefficient translates into actual Draft picks. I will refer to 
the table below to illustrate this analysis. 
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  Case I Case II Case III Case IV 
Pick HS Exp. Value HS Exp. Value HS Exp. Value HS Exp. Value 
1 0 $5,546,700 0 $5,546,700 0 $5,546,700 0 $5,546,700 
2 0 $5,529,027 0 $5,529,027 0 $5,529,027 0 $5,529,027 
3 0 $5,511,354 0 $5,511,354 0 $5,511,354 0 $5,511,354 
4 0 $5,493,681 0 $5,493,681 0 $5,493,681 0 $5,493,681 
5 0 $5,476,008 0 $5,476,008 0 $5,476,008 1 $7,047,259 
6 0 $4,748,610 0 $4,748,610 0 $4,748,610 0 $4,748,610 
7 0 $4,730,937 0 $4,730,937 0 $4,730,937 0 $4,730,937 
8 0 $3,324,635 0 $3,324,635 1 $4,895,886 0 $3,324,635 
9 0 $3,306,962 0 $3,306,962 0 $3,306,962 0 $3,306,962 
10 0 $3,289,289 0 $3,289,289 0 $3,289,289 0 $3,289,289 
11 0 $2,240,776 0 $2,240,776 0 $2,240,776 0 $2,240,776 
12 0 $2,223,103 0 $2,223,103 0 $2,223,103 0 $2,223,103 
13 0 $2,205,430 1 $3,776,681 0 $2,205,430 0 $2,205,430 
 
Case I shows the expected value of the top 13 Draft picks based on the Stepwise control model. 
The values are strictly decreasing, as they always are for this model. If, on the other hand, we 
assume that one of these players is being drafted out of high school, then we would add the high 
school coefficient to that expected value. Case II shows the maximum impact that the high 
school lottery effect can have on a Draft pick. Based on this model, a high school player who is 
taken 13th is drafted, on average, five spots too low. We can say this because the player’s 
expected value of $3,776,681 is larger than that of the five players drafted directly above him. 
The team selecting eighth would have been best served by taking him, but the high school lottery 
bias caused him to fall to the 13th pick. Case III shows the position in the lottery where the high 
school effect has the least impact. In this case, the expected value of the high school player, 
$4,895,886, indicates that he should have been taken with the eighth pick instead of the 10th. 
This movement of two positions represents the smallest possible Draft pick effect that 
corresponds with the high school lottery coefficient. For the 11 high school players selected in 
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the lottery, the average Draft position, rounded to the nearest whole number, was fifth. A high 
school player taken at this average value is shown in Case IV. In this scenario the model 
indicates that the high school player has the highest expected value of any player available. The 
implication here is that he should have been selected first; hence, he was picked four spots too 
low. In this way, I have obtained a maximum, minimum, and average amount of Draft pick bias 
to correspond with the high school lottery coefficient. I will use a similar approach in the other 
sections of this paper. 
Since the Stepwise model moves very unevenly, I also analyzed the results based on the 
smoother Polynomial model. These results were similar, with the range showing that high school 
lottery players would be taken four to six picks too low, with the average player taken four spots 
too low. Four selections may not seem like a lot, but with such a high Draft selection, it can be 
the difference between a decent player and a franchise player. Among the high school lottery 
players in my data are great players like Kevin Garnett (1995, #5), Kobe Bryant (1996, #13), 
Tracy McGrady (1997, #9), and Amare Stoudemire (2003, #9). Missing out on players of this 
caliber can be a franchise altering event. It is also worth noting that the high school players 
themselves lose income when they get drafted lower, and end up lower on the rookie pay scale. 
Recent events have made this issue no longer relevant since the NBA has now instituted an age 
requirement that prevents players from declaring for the Draft out of high school. My statistical 
analysis suggests that this NBA rule may, in fact, benefit the players by forcing them to play a 
year of college basketball, eliminating this high school lottery bias. 
These models present strong evidence that risk aversion is a major part of the decision 
making process of NBA teams. This apparent discrimination against high school players can 
only be rationally explained by the willingness of teams to pay a premium for the relative 
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security of a college player rather than gambling on a less proven high school player. The fact 
that this effect is concentrated in the lottery seems to further verify this hypothesis. Unless a pick 
has been traded, teams drafting in the lottery are teams that have missed the playoffs in the 
previous season and are in need of improvement. One would assume that a team in this position 
is less willing to assume risk, given their great need, while a team that had more success in the 
previous season can afford to take a risk, since they have less immediate need. It seems to 
follow, logically, that the bias against high school players is strongest among teams drafting in 
the lottery. 
 
Center Effect 
 The position of center is the most exclusionary in all of basketball, given the inherent 
necessity of height that comes with it. Dominant big men have been a major part of the NBA 
from the very beginning, with players like Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, Wilt Chamberlain, Patrick 
Ewing, Hakeem Olajuwon, Shaquille O’Neal and Tim Duncan at the center of so many great 
teams. The conventional wisdom for a long time was that any dominant team needed to have an 
elite big man. Michael Jordan’s Bulls dynasty destroyed this assumption. However, since then, 
Shaquille O’Neal and Tim Duncan have accounted for a large percentage of the NBA 
championship titles. The perceived need for a big man is reflected in the Draft. When players 
like Ewing, Olajuwon, Shaq, Duncan, and recently Greg Oden are available, they are always 
selected right away. Unfortunately, for every dominant center there are many more that are 
unable to take their game to the next level. It seems as though every Draft has a center prospect 
that showed some potential but was a flop in the NBA. In order to test for Draft order bias 
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towards centers, I created dummy variables similar to those in the high school model and added 
them to my Stepwise control model yielding the following results. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-$145,625    -$70,735 $73,668   -$49,185 
Center 
(0.86)    (0.31) (0.39)   (0.22) 
  
-
$233,461   -$164,770   $330,618 $376,854 
Center 
Rd 1 
  (0.94)   (0.50)   (1.04) (0.98) 
   -$992,782   -$1,062,644 -$1,301,097 -$1,297,570 Center 
Lot     (2.75)   (2.64) (2.78) (2.77) 
 
The initial results were not at all convincing, but as I segmented the center population I found 
that there was a pronounced bias in favor of centers selected with a lottery pick. Lottery picks 
represent a group more than twice as large as the group of high school lottery picks. Of the 119 
centers in the data set, 53 were first round picks and 24 were selected in the lottery. I found the 
result particularly interesting, given the degree to which the effect is concentrated in the lottery. 
The latter models even show that the effect for centers taken later in the first round (picks 14-29), 
while not particularly significant, has the opposite sign of the lottery effect. Clearly, there must 
be a reason, specific to teams drafting in the lottery, which causes centers to be overvalued to the 
point that when they get a new contract, they earn an average of $992,782 less than other players 
drafted in the same position. 
 When other variables are included in the model, the effect remains very strong. While the 
coefficient and z-value are negatively affected by adding some of the variables, the final model 
still shows a strong coefficient, with a z-value that is significant at the 95% level. 
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  1 2 3 4 5 
-$992,782 -$1,098,424 -$875,216 -$950,537 -$936,200 Center 
Lot (2.75) (3.06) (2.41) (2.63) (2.59) 
  $1,681,296    $1,571,251 HS 
Lottery   (3.13)    (2.95) 
    $404,970   $401,490 
Black 
    (1.95)   (1.84) 
   -$570,629  -$547,852 Black Rd 
2    (2.27)  (2.20) 
      -$432,953 -$390,714 
Foreign 
      (1.42) (1.24) 
     $780,027 $814,509 
For 95-01 
      (1.97) (2.09) 
 
The final model shows that centers taken in the lottery earn $936,200 less in their next contract 
than the average player taken at their Draft position. You may recall from earlier graphs that the 
Stepwise model predicted a center coefficient of smaller magnitude than the other two control 
models. This is likely due to smaller salary projections for the top few picks, meaning that the 
other models may give slightly better coefficient estimates for this particular effect. The 
coefficients from the other two models are both of magnitude greater than -$1,100,000. These 
coefficients suggest a statistically significant effect on where centers are drafted. 
 The next piece of analysis is determining how the coefficient we find translates into 
actual Draft order. When looking at lottery picks, the Stepwise model gives a range that the 
center lottery effect could influence Draft position from as little as zero positions to a maximum 
of being taken seven picks too high. The average center in the lottery was taken with the seventh 
pick. My Stepwise model suggests that a center drafted seventh would end up being drafted in 
the correct position, but this result is misleading. Since the seventh pick in this model is right on 
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the edge of a large step down, the center effect is insufficient to reduce the player’s value enough 
so that he falls to the next echelon. In this case, we would get a more representative value by 
consulting the Polynomial control model. With this model, the center-lottery effect has a 
minimum impact of a player going four picks too high, and a maximum effect of that player 
going nine picks too high. At the average Draft position of seven, the effect is that the player was 
taken five spots too high, so he should have gone 12th. As with the high school effect, this proves 
to be meaningful when the stakes are as high as they are in the NBA Draft. In the 1998 Draft, 
overvalued centers Michael Olowokandi (#1) and Robert Traylor (#6) were selected before Dirk 
Nowitzki (#9) and Paul Pierce (#10). A poor selection in the lottery can be very costly in the 
long run. 
The allure of having a dominant big man is likely a contributing factor in this overvaluing 
of centers in the NBA Draft. A team that can obtain a franchise center has a great chance of 
eventually winning a championship; the problem is that such centers are hard to come by. A 
team drafting in the middle of the lottery may be tempted to Draft a pretty good center and hope 
that he might be the next great big man; unfortunately, this is never really the case. Teams are so 
eager for a franchise center, if one is available, he will be drafted first with almost no exception. 
Despite this, teams continue to take big men later in the lottery hoping they have found a 
bargain. In reality, if the player was good enough, he would have been taken earlier. This seems 
like the most likely explanation for this unusual Draft bias. Another possibility is that the NBA 
game has become faster and more athletic, making centers unnecessary and ineffective. While 
there is some evidence for this, there are still dominant centers. This rationale would also not 
explain why the effect only exists in the lottery. Another explanation, which meshes with the 
hypothesis from the high school effect, is that drafting centers in the lottery is a form of risk 
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aversion. Since height is a known quantity, while talent can be more difficult to judge. Taking a 
big man may feel like a safer pick. This theory has some appeal, but ultimately it is incomplete. 
If that explanation were true then we would see a similar coefficient for centers outside the 
lottery, or at least one with the same sign. 
In analyzing these theories it is important to remember that this model assumes that 
players are paid their market value. The model picks up differences between where players are 
drafted and what they eventually sign for, hence any bias is specific to the drafting process. For 
this reason, I find the explanation regarding franchise centers to be the most plausible. While it is 
a reasonable explanation, it still does not mean the trend is reasonable. It is extremely rare for a 
franchise center to be found anywhere other than the first overall pick, and for teams to continue 
to think that they will be successful by overvaluing centers, seems irrational. 
 
Race Effect 
 As I detailed in my introduction, there is strong evidence from the past showing salary 
discrimination against black players in the NBA. Current evidence for this is limited, but at the 
very least the paper by Kanazawa & Funk (2001) indicates that NBA fans do have a bias towards 
white players. One might expect this bias to show itself in the hiring process in one way or 
another.  
My analysis cannot address racially based pay discrimination because one of the 
fundamental assumptions I make is that each player is paid his fair market value. If white players 
are in fact paid more due to their greater marketable production, then my model will take that as 
their real worth. Adding a race variable to the control model will pick up on any irregularities in 
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the way black players are drafted versus others.14 The approach here is different from those I 
described in the introduction and it does not indicate, one way or another, whether there is racial 
bias in compensation. 
 When I inserted dummy variables for black players into the model, the result was less 
than overwhelming; however, when I created separate dummies for black players taken in the 
first round and those taken in the second round, I found significant results. Not only is there a 
significant coefficient for black players selected in the first round, it has the opposite sign of the 
coefficient for black second round picks. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
$139,618             $481,148 
Black 
(0.89)             (2.33) 
  $517,609       $475,996 $630,873 $481,148   
Black Rd 1 
  (2.57)       (2.15) (1.96) (2.33)   
   $461,223     $154,877       Black 
Lottery     (1.47)     (0.45)       
      $368,896     -$154,877     Black Non-
Lot       (1.71)     (0.45)     
      
-
$257,782     -$158,265 -$639,413 Black Rd 2 
        (1.34)     (0.81) (2.54) 
 
The coefficients here are not as large as for the high school and center effects, but this is partially 
due to the fact that this analysis deals with the late first round and the second round. Players 
drafted in these positions have less expected earnings, so these coefficients still represent a 
significant percentage of these players’ anticipated income. It is also interesting to note that the 
coefficients for black lottery players and black non-lottery players are fairly similar, even though 
the coefficient represents a larger percentage of the non-lottery player’s eventual salary. Another 
                                                 
14
 I say “black” players because my distinction is based on general appearance rather than specific racial 
background. A dark-skinned player from America, Africa, France, or any other area is considered black while non-
black would be comprised of any other players including Americans, Europeans, Asians, etc. 
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difference between the black player effect and the two previous effects is the sample size, which 
is significantly larger. Of the 514 players in the data, 362 are black with 182 of them taken in the 
first round and 180 taken in the second round. Of the four biases I discovered, this one affects the 
largest group. 
 When testing this effect with my other variables, I chose to use the dummy variables for 
black players and black players taken in the second round, the combination from column nine in 
the above table. The purpose of this combination is that the ‘Black’ dummy variable picks up the 
effect for black players taken in the first round, while the ‘Black Rd 2’ dummy picks up the 
difference between the first round effect and the second round effect. The coefficients and z-
values are slightly weaker when other variables are added, but in the end the results remain 
meaningful and statistically significant. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
$481,148 $438,553 $404,970 $528,694 $401,490 
Black 
(2.33) (2.14) (1.95) (2.42) (1.84) 
-$639,413 -$606,688 -$570,629 -$661,098 -$547,852 Black Rd 
2 (2.54) (2.43) (2.27) (2.64) (2.20) 
  $1,436,276     $1,571,251 
HS Lottery 
  (2.69)     (2.95) 
   -$875,216  -$936,200 Center 
Lot    (2.41)  (2.59) 
      -$456,335 -$390,714 
Foreign 
      (1.43) (1.24) 
     $907,513 $814,509 
For 95-01 
      (2.30) (2.09) 
 
In the full combination model, the ‘Black’ coefficient of $401,490 is significant at the 90% level, 
while the ‘Black Rd 2’ coefficient is significant at the 95% level. These results strongly suggest 
that black players who are selected in the first round tend to be drafted lower than they should 
be. Furthermore, it seems that black players taken in the second round tend to be selected higher 
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than they should be, although this evidence is not overwhelming. The least disputable point of all 
is that there is a difference between the way black players are drafted in the first round, and the 
way that they are drafted in the second round. This shift may be the most interesting result of all. 
 Having obtained these coefficients, we can get a sense of how much movement this bias 
creates in the Draft itself. Since the analysis is based on full rounds, there are wider ranges of 
possible effects than we saw with high school players and centers, but the effects are still 
meaningful. The maximum effect for black first round picks is that they are selected seven 
positions too low. This occurs towards the end of the round where the slope is flatter. The 
minimum effect is zero, which occurs at the points where a step drops off in the Stepwise 
function. The average position for black players taken in the first round is 15th, in which case the 
player would have been taken an average of four spots too low. The Polynomial model yields 
similar results, with the minimum effect at one, the maximum effect at seven, and the mean 
effect at two. Both models indicate that the average black first round pick is selected at least two 
spots too low. 
 Even though it is smaller, the black second round coefficient translates to a significant 
number of picks, since the expected earnings slope in the second round is fairly flat. The 
Stepwise model has a constant slope for the second round, so the effect is the same for any 
position in that round. Based on the second round coefficient, the Stepwise model indicates that 
black players taken in the second round are taken eight spots higher than they should be. For the 
average black second round position, which is 44th, this means that the player should have been 
selected 52nd. The stakes are certainly not as high in the second round as they are in the first, but 
this still represents a substantial overvaluing. Since the Polynomial model is not strictly 
increasing for the entire second round, it gives a much broader range for the potential bias. It 
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shows the bias could be anywhere from one pick to 21 picks, but interestingly it yields the same 
value of eight in the case of a player selected 44th overall. With evidence suggesting contrasting 
black effects for the two rounds of the Draft; all that is left is to speculate as to the root of this 
peculiarity. 
 Any Draft bias against black players necessarily implies a bias in favor of white players. 
There is a popular theory that white players tend to be drafted too high because teams want a 
franchise player who can be easily marketed to a predominantly white audience. This could 
provide part of the explanation for the first round effect, but it would seem to conflict with the 
observed second round effect. It seems that any adequate explanation for this phenomenon needs 
to simultaneously explain the first round trend and the second round trend. Such a theory would 
have to be based on an analysis of the inherent differences in the two rounds that might make 
teams act in completely opposite ways. The two major differences that exist between the rounds 
are guaranteed contracts and the likelihood of success for drafted players. First round picks 
receive automatic three year contracts, while second round picks have to fight for a roster spot. 
Based on my results, I conclude that black players are drafted as a high variance group. That is to 
say, if a black player and a white player have the same expected value, the black player is 
perceived to have more upside, as well as more downside. Unfortunately, my analysis cannot 
address the issue of whether or not this is really the case, but the data indicates that teams 
perceive this to be the case and Draft accordingly. In the first round, teams are likely to be more 
risk averse since the opportunity cost is higher in the form of a guaranteed contract. In the second 
round, the teams should be more interested in option value, since they are not obligated to retain 
the player. This situation puts a premium on high variance players. Non-black players are taken 
too high in the first round because teams pay a premium to avoid risk. In the second round, black 
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players are taken too high because teams are willing to pay a premium to obtain greater option 
value. Whether or not it is a valid generalization, my analysis shows that teams act in a manner 
that assumes a correlation between race and variance of performance. 
 
Foreign Player Effect 
 As was the case with high school players, the popularity of drafting foreign players rose 
significantly during the time of my analysis. The table, below, shows the slow increase in the 
number of foreign players drafted each year, culminating with large increases in 2002 and 2003. 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Sum 
Foreign 
Players 3 5 6 5 5 9 7 13 19 72 
 
Foreign players selected in the Draft have had mixed results. While some have gone on to be 
stars, a number of others have been unsuccessful, with some never even joining the team that 
drafted them. With such an unpredictable group of incoming players, it seems that there is room 
to tease out some trends governing the way that these players were evaluated and selected. 
 To my surprise, my initial analysis of foreign players proved to be fruitless. By simply 
inserting a dummy variable for foreign players into my model, I achieved a coefficient that is 
almost noteworthy in its insignificance. On the surface, there appears to be a complete lack of 
evidence for any bias regarding the drafting of foreign players. A deeper analysis, however, 
shows that this is not the case. Far more foreign players were taken in 2002 and 2003 than in the 
previous years of my data. This shift provides a useful partition within the larger category of 
foreign players. When grouped by year, the data provides a much more compelling result. 
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  1 2 3 4 
-$17,216    -$495,048 
Foreign 
(0.08)    (1.62) 
    $347,322 $842,370 
For 95-01 
   (1.30) (2.12) 
    -$495,048   
For 02-03 
    (1.62)   
  -$113,285     
For 95 
  (0.12)     
 $640,290    
For 96 
  (0.88)     
  -$319,958     
For 97 
  (0.46)     
 -$130,511    
For 98 
  (0.18)     
 $543,994    
For 99 
 (0.76)    
  $590,977     
For 00 
  (1.02)     
 $814,790    
For 01 
  (1.34)     
  -$550,697     
For 02 
  (1.07)     
 -$462,944    
For 03 
  (1.22)     
 
The breakdown, by year, shows a general scattering of results that grow increasingly positive in 
1999, 2000, and 2001. The trend reverses in 2002, when we see a strong negative coefficient that 
continues into 2003. When grouped in this way, a grouping that is also suggested by the number 
drafted per year, the data points to a clear trend. From 1995-2001, foreign players in the Draft 
generally outperformed their Draft position. Then in 2002 and 2003, when more foreign players 
were selected, they began to underperform relative to expectations. In an approach similar to my 
handling of the black player Draft bias, I used the ‘Foreign’ dummy variable to pick up the 
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foreign effect for 2002-2003, and the ‘For 95-01’ dummy to pick up the difference between the 
2002-2003 effect and the 1995-2001 effect. 
 In a model with the other variables I have discussed, the foreign variables are somewhat 
diminished, but they do not lose all statistical significance. Neither the 1995-2001 nor the 2002-
2003 effect maintains significance, even at the 90% level, but the variable picking up the 
difference between the two effects is significant at the 95% level in the final combination model. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
-$495,048 -$465,656 -$432,953 -$456,335 -$390,714 
Foreign 
(1.62) (-1.54) (1.42) (1.43) (1.24) 
$842,370 $827,194 $780,027 $907,513 $814,509 
For 95-01 
(2.12) (2.10) (1.97) (2.30) (2.09) 
  $1,507,133     $1,571,251 
HS Lottery 
  (2.82)     (2.95) 
   -$950,537  -$936,200 Center 
Lot    (2.63)  (2.59) 
      $528,694 $401,490 
Black 
      (2.42) (1.84) 
     -$661,098 -$547,852 Black Rd 
2       (2.64) (2.20) 
 
The result here can hardly be considered a surprise, given the significant increase in the number 
of players drafted from the first period to the second. It is highly improbable that the amount of 
international talent increased that abruptly, so it stands to reason that demand for foreign players 
rose without a similar increase in supply. The result was that teams paid too high a price for 
these players, who then underperformed relative to these inflated expectations. 
 Of the four effects I analyzed, this is the most difficult to convert from a coefficient into 
Draft picks, because the effect is not confined to the lottery or even to just one round. The 
Stepwise model shows the Foreign 95-01 effect as having a minimum effect of zero at the 
beginning of the first round, and a maximum effect of 23 positions for players taken in the latter 
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part of the second round. At the average Draft position for these players, which is 32nd, the 
corresponding effect on Draft position is that the player was taken ten spots too low. The 
Polynomial model gives a possible bias range from one to 24, and, at the mean value, the bias is 
also ten. Looking at the 2002-2003 Drafts, we see the same bias range in the Stepwise model due 
to its constant slope late in the Draft. The bias ranges from zero to 23, but in this case the players 
are being taken too high. At the mean selection value of 33, players are taken 23 spots too high. 
The Polynomial model yields similar results, in this case with a range from zero to 25 and a bias 
of 22 picks at the average selection point in the Draft. The difference in the amount of Draft pick 
bias that corresponds with the similar coefficients of the two groups, is due to the fact that the 
slope is much steeper moving up the curve than it is moving down, meaning a coefficient of the 
same magnitude will create a larger pick effect if it is negative than it would if it was positive. 
Since there is just one coefficient for both rounds, this analysis is not as insightful when dealing 
with foreign players as it was for other groups; but, it is clear that the coefficient is meaningful in 
the sense that it translates to actual drafting error. 
 It is interesting to compare the way that teams perceive foreign players to their perception 
of high school players. Based on the bias against high school players, I concluded that teams are 
risk averse in the Draft, especially in the lottery. One would think that this risk aversion would 
also apply to foreigners, who have not played college basketball and, hence, cannot be evaluated 
as easily as their American counterparts. Initially, this appeared to be the case as foreign players 
were drafted lower than they should have been; a trend that fits neatly into the risk aversion 
theory. What is interesting is that teams eventually changed their behavior, going so far as to 
overcompensate and make the opposite error. This change in behavior did not occur in the 
drafting of high school players, which begs the obvious question of why this is the case. One 
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theory is that the smaller sample size, 22 high school players to 72 foreigners, did not give ample 
opportunity for teams to change their behavior. Another possibility is that the allure of attracting 
international fans helped to overcome the risk-averse tendencies of many teams. Perhaps early 
random successes with foreign players caused teams to overestimate their ability to predict 
foreign player performance in the NBA. There is also the simple fact that more foreign players 
were taken later in the Draft, an area where we suspect teams are more willing to accept risk than 
in the lottery. Either way, the risk associated with foreign players was perceived as either less 
significant or more tolerable than the risk inherent in high school prospects. This led to the great 
shift in ideology towards foreign players, from undervaluing them in the period from 1995-2001 
to overvaluing them in 2002 and 2003. 
 
Conclusion 
 My analysis of the 1995-2003 NBA Drafts yielded a variety of results. By creating 
control models that predict a player’s eventual value based on their Draft position, I was able to 
detect bias related to four distinct groups of players in the Draft. The first of these groups is 
players who declared for the Draft directly out of high school. These players consistently 
outperformed their Draft position, especially those drafted in the lottery, and they appear to have 
been the victims of a bias driven by risk aversion among NBA teams. A second group subject to 
bias was centers who were selected with lottery picks, although the bias towards them worked in 
their favor. The root of this bias is somewhat unclear, but it is likely the result of teams deluding 
themselves in their overeager pursuit of a franchise center. The third group that I found to be 
subject to bias were black players who consistently out-performed their Draft position in the first 
round, but under-performed relative to Draft position in the second round. This fits the model of 
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a group that is perceived to be high variance such that risk-averse teams might pass on them in 
the first round, but prefer them in the second round when their greater perceived option value 
improves their Draft position. The final group that I found to be subject to bias was foreign 
players, who over-performed relative to their Draft position from 1995-2001, and then 
subsequently under-performed as more of them were drafted in 2002 and 2003. Though each 
effect is derived from the same Draft order bias model, every one of these trends represents a 
unique issue in the NBA hiring market that points to different biases and tendencies. 
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Appendix A: Distribution of Players by Draft Year 
 
HS = High School 
C = Center 
B = Black 
F = Foreign 
 
First Round: 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1 B B C,B C,B B C,B HS,C,B C,F HS,B 
2 B B   B B B HS,B B C,F 
3 B B B   B HS,B F   B 
4 B B B B B B HS,C,B B B 
5 HS,B B C,B B HS,B   B F B 
6 C B B C,B   B B B C 
7 B B B   B C,B B B,F   
8 B B C,B B B B HS,C,B B B 
9 B B HS,B F B C,B B HS,B B 
10 B C,B B B B B B B B 
11 B C B B   B B B B,F 
12   C   C C C,B C,F B   
13 B HS,B B C,B B B B B B 
14 B F B B B B   B   
15     C,B   C,F C C,B F B 
16 B B B   B F   F B 
17   HS,C,B B C,F   B   B C,F 
18 B B C,F F B B C,B   B 
19 B B C   B C,B B B F 
20 B C,F C B B B C,B B B 
21 B B B B C B B B B,F 
22 C B B C,B B B B   F 
23 B C,F B B B HS,B B B HS,B 
24 C B B B F C,F F C,F B 
25 B F B HS,B B C,F B B F 
26 B B B   B C,B C,B B HS,B 
27 B   B C,F B F B B HS,C,B 
28 C C,B,F B B   B B,F   B,F 
29 B C No Pick C,B HS,B   No Pick No Pick B 
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Second Round: 
 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
30 B B C B B F B B F 
31 C,F   B B B   B B   
32 B   B HS,B B B B C   
33 B B B C,B   C B B B 
34   B F B C B B B C,B,F 
35 B B B C,F B,C B   B F 
36 B   B C,B C,F C,B,F B F B 
37 B B B,C C B,C B B C,F   
38 C,B C,B B B B   C,F B   
39 B   B B C,B B B B C,F 
40 B B B HS,B F   B F B,F 
41   B C,B B C,B B B C,F B 
42 B B C,B B B C,B,F B B C,F 
43 B B B C,B B B C C B 
44 C,B B B C,B C,B   B B C,B,F 
45 B C B B   C,B B B   
46 B B B B   B C,B B F 
47 B B B B C F HS,B C,B B 
48 B   B   B B F B HS,C,B 
49 B C,B F B C,B   C,B F B 
50 B C,B B,F C C,B B C,B   B,F 
51 F B   B B F B F   
52   C B B B C,B B B C,F 
53 C   B B B C B B B 
54 C,F B C B B B B B C,F 
55 C B C,B   B B B F   
56 B B C,F B C B F F B 
57 B     B F B C,B B C,F 
58 B C,B C,F B B B B B C,F 
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Summary by Category: 
 
 
 HS HS Rd 1 HS-Lot Foreign Black 
Black  
Rd 1 
Black  
Rd 2 Center 
Center Rd 
1 
Center-
Lot 
1995 1 1 1 3 44 22 22 10 4 1 
1996 2 1 1 5 40 20 20 14 8 3 
1997 1 1 1 6 44 23 21 15 7 3 
1998 3 1 0 5 41 18 23 15 8 4 
1999 2 2 1 5 41 21 20 14 3 1 
2000 2 2 1 9 38 19 19 15 9 4 
2001 5 4 4 7 46 22 24 14 8 4 
2002 1 1 1 13 35 17 18 9 2 2 
2003 5 4 1 19 33 20 13 13 4 2 
Sum 22 17 11 72 362 182 180 119 53 24 
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Appendix B: NBA Rookie Scale Contracts, 2003 Draft 
 
 
4th Opt 5th Qualifying 4th Opt 
5th 
Qualifying Pick 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
At 100% Rookie Scale Salaries %Increases 
1 $3,349,100  $3,600,300  $3,851,500  $4,856,742  $6,313,764  26.10% 30.00% 
2 $2,996,500  $3,221,200  $3,446,000  $4,348,852  $5,675,252  26.20% 30.50% 
3 $2,691,000  $2,892,800  $3,094,700  $3,911,701  $5,132,151  26.40% 31.20% 
4 $2,426,100  $2,608,100  $2,790,000  $3,529,350  $4,655,213  26.50% 31.90% 
5 $2,197,000  $2,361,800  $2,526,600  $3,201,202  $4,244,794  26.70% 32.60% 
6 $1,995,500  $2,145,200  $2,294,800  $2,909,806  $3,881,682  26.80% 33.40% 
7 $1,821,600  $1,958,200  $2,094,900  $2,660,523  $3,567,761  27.00% 34.10% 
8 $1,668,900  $1,794,000  $1,919,200  $2,441,222  $3,290,768  27.20% 34.80% 
9 $1,534,000  $1,649,100  $1,764,100  $2,247,463  $3,045,313  27.40% 35.50% 
10 $1,457,300  $1,566,600  $1,675,900  $2,136,773  $2,910,284  27.50% 36.20% 
11 $1,384,400  $1,488,300  $1,592,100  $2,112,717  $2,892,309  32.70% 36.90% 
12 $1,315,200  $1,413,900  $1,512,500  $2,084,225  $2,867,894  37.80% 37.60% 
13 $1,249,500  $1,343,200  $1,436,900  $2,053,330  $2,839,756  42.90% 38.30% 
14 $1,187,000  $1,276,000  $1,365,000  $2,021,565  $2,811,997  48.10% 39.10% 
15 $1,127,600  $1,212,200  $1,296,800  $1,987,994  $2,779,216  53.30% 39.80% 
16 $1,071,200  $1,151,600  $1,231,900  $1,889,735  $2,655,077  53.40% 40.50% 
17 $1,017,700  $1,094,000  $1,170,300  $1,797,581  $2,538,184  53.60% 41.20% 
18 $966,800  $1,039,300  $1,111,800  $1,709,948  $2,426,417  53.80% 41.90% 
19 $923,300  $992,500  $1,061,800  $1,635,172  $2,331,755  54.00% 42.60% 
20 $886,400  $952,800  $1,019,300  $1,571,761  $2,252,333  54.20% 43.30% 
21 $850,900  $914,700  $978,500  $1,558,751  $2,246,159  59.30% 44.10% 
22 $816,900  $878,100  $939,400  $1,545,313  $2,237,613  64.50% 44.80% 
23 $784,200  $843,000  $901,800  $1,530,355  $2,226,666  69.70% 45.50% 
24 $752,800  $809,300  $865,800  $1,514,284  $2,213,884  74.90% 46.20% 
25 $722,700  $776,900  $831,100  $1,496,811  $2,198,816  80.10% 46.90% 
26 $698,800  $751,200  $803,600  $1,448,891  $2,138,563  80.30% 47.60% 
27 $678,600  $729,500  $780,400  $1,407,842  $2,087,829  80.40% 48.30% 
28 $674,400  $725,000  $775,500  $1,399,778  $2,085,668  80.50% 49.00% 
29 $669,500  $719,700  $769,900  $1,389,670  $2,084,504  80.50% 50.00% 
     
 
   
Pick #1 receives $3,349,100 in his first NBA year, $3,600,300 in his second NBA year, and so forth. 
Figures reflect 100% of rookie scale contract salaries.  NBA teams have some salary discretion in years 1-3 
(salaries can range from 80% to 100% of the rookie scale contract salaries).  The percent increases with the 
exercise of the team's options in years four and five must be at the stated rates. 
        
Source:  cbafaq.com    
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Appendix C: Interval Regression Model 
 
The interval regression model is estimated using Stata’s intreg command, which is specifically 
designed to handle interval censored dependent variables.  Intreg accommodates censoring that 
may vary from observation to observation.   
This is a maximum likelihood estimation procedure, with observations of the dependent variable 
either uncensored point data or censored interval data.  Let j J∈ index the observations, and let 
P J⊂  be the set of point observations and I J⊂  be the set of interval observations.  For each 
j I∈ , then, the interval used in the estimation is 1 2,j jy y   , where 1jy = −∞  for left-censored 
data and 2jy = ∞  for right-censored data. 
NBA players at the league maximum salary are right-censored; NBA dropouts fall in the salary 
interval ranging from 0 to the player-specific league minimum salary. 
 
The underlying model is: 
  , whereβ= +y X ε ε ~ 2( , ).N σ0 I  
 
The log likelihood function with censoring is: 
 ( )
2
2 121ln log 2 log
2
j j j
j P j I
y x y x y x
L
β β β
πσ
σ σ σ∈ ∈
   − − −        
= − + + Φ −Φ        
         
∑ ∑  
where ( ).Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution function. 
 
For details see Amemiya (1973). 
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